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In December 2002, the possible number of members of the European Union increased from 
15 to 25, one of the new members being Lithuania. Whether the 10 entrants will actually 
become members will, however, depend on the outcome of referendums, to take place in the 
new member countries. But the very fact that the number of members is going to increase 
substantially will, of course, affect the functioning of the European Union, for the newcomers 
as well as for the old members. On this background, it may be worth while to try to 
summarise some aspects of the development of the European Union, especially with respect 
to problems related to macro economic policies. In this field, the most important new aspect is 
the creation of a foreign exchange union. Since 1999/2001, the euro has been the common 
currency for 12 of the member countries. 
 
The choice of subject also reflects the fact that, since 1991, I have had the privilege of visiting 
Lithuania almost every year together with my colleage, Jørgen Birk Mortensen. From 1992 
onwards, we have participated in, and presented papers to, the yearly conferences in Kaunas, 
arranged by the Faculty of Economics and Management, Kaunas University of Technology. 
(In 1991, we participated in a seminar in Palanga with representatives from Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia as well as from Kaliningrad). The subject of most of my papers has been related 
to aspects of the European Union. On this background, it is appropriate for me to give some 
comments on the history and the future prospects for the new European Union. 
 
It should be emphasised that the very fact that more than 20 European countries, which had 
extremely different political conditions 50 years ago, now are members of the same union, is 
an important accomplishment, not least from a political viewpoint and seen on the 
background of the history of the first half of the 20th century as well as the subsequent post 
war period. Of course, during this process many problems have not found satisfactory 
solutions. In the economic debate, problems related to a foreign exchange union have played 
an important role during the last 30 years; they will be dealt with in the last part of the present 
paper. In the first part, some comments will be made on other important problems, even if 
they are not basically economic, i.e. the political philosophy behind the Union, the number of 
member countries, now and in the future, the mobility of labour and the problems it may 
create, partly from a cultural viewpoint and partly from an economic. 
 
Subsequently, before we embark upon the macro economic problems, the agricultural policy 
of the European Union deserves some comments. 
 
 
Federation or Confederation? 
 
The predecessor of the economic part of the Union, the treaty on European Economic 
Cooperation (EEC), was formed in 1957 with six members (France, Western Germany, Italy 
and the Benelux). In 1973, the EEC got three additional members (Britain, Ireland and 
Denmark), and during the 1980´ies the number of members increased to twelve (new 
members: Greece, Spain and Portugal). Finally, in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became 
members, bringing the total to 15. In 1993, the Union got its present name. 
 
During most of this period, there has been basic disagreement as to whether the cooperation 
should take the form of a federation (the United States of Europe) or a confederation (the 
Europe of Nations). A confederation implies that each member country only participates in 
the cooperation in areas where it shares the viewpoints of the other members. France - and de 
Gaulle in particular - always has had preferences for a basic confederation structure; France 
never has been happy to accept to be overruled by a majority of the other members. A 
confederation allows for a AEurope at different speeds@, where some members may extend the 
cooperation further than the rest. A right for each member to veto decisions is part of the pure 
confederation concept. 
 
Obviously, with an increasing number of members, a pure confederation concept could easily 
lead to a complete lack of ability for the Union to make decisions, because one member might 
always veto any decision. If a group of members is allowed to proceed at a faster speed, they 
may, among themselves, intensify cooperation, but at the expense of the unity of the Union, 
seen as a whole. In addition, even in a confederation, the biggest (most influential) members 
may expect their vote to weigh more than those of the smaller member countries. In practice, 
most decisions will be taken by majority vote, the weight of each member country depending 
on its size etc. 
 
In principle, a federation is simpler. The same legislation holds for all member countries, and 
decisions are taken at the central level, cf. eg. the United States. Hence a substantial part of 
sovereignty of each member country is handed over to the central authority. Perhaps some 
subject areas may be left with the individual member countries, cf. debates on the Aprinciple 
of subsidiarity@, but such areas may be difficult to define and agree upon. 
 
In practice, the legal framework behind the Union is a mixture of federal elements and 
elements of confederation. In most member countries, the population is reluctant to accept too 
many federal elements, while the top of the Union usually has federal preferences to a higher 
extent. In addition, disagreement has always existed with respect to the decision making 
bodies of the Union and the division of power between them. The Commission is not elected, 
but appointed, and is supposed not to represent national interests. The European Council (the 
Councils of Ministers) consist of Heads of States (cabinet members) and have the main 
political power. The Parliament is elected every five years (next time in 2004) by direct 
elections in all member countries, the number of members from each country depending on 
the size of the country. 
 
 
Table 1. EU applicants: Population and per capita income, 2000. 
 
Country                              Population,           GNP per capita, 
                                                           million persons             1000 euro 
    Poland 38.7 4.4 
Czech Republic 10.3 5.4 
Hungary 10.0 5.0 
Slovakia 5.4 3.9 
Lithuania 3.7 3.3 
Latvia 2.4 3.3 
Slovenia 2.0 9.8 
Estonia 1.4 3.8 
Cyprus 0.8 14.2  
Malta 0.4 9.9 
   
Turkey 65.3 3.2 
Rumania 22.4 1.8 
Bulgaria   8.2 1.6 
 
EU-15 377.0 22.6 
 
   
With many new member countries, the decision process will easily become increasingly 
complex. Therefore, a Convention has been established with the purpose of designing a new 
constitution for the Union.The aim is to agree on a simple structure, but it is rather unlikely 
that such a result will be reached. Instead, the outcome will probably be similar to the present 
state of affairs or a complex constitution, reflecting many political compromises. 
 
Member countries with many inhabitants will always have more weight in the decision 
making process than the small ones. Up to 1989, France, Western Germany, Britain and Italy 
all had roughly 60 million inhabitants each, but after the reunion the German population has 
increased to more than 80 million. After these four countries comes Spain with almost 40   






As appears from the foregoing, it will be a difficult task to create an efficient legal framework 
which will be acceptable for all the members, old and new, rich and poor. In this connection, 
the different income levels of the old members and the new ones should be stressed, the 
income level of the new members being much lower than that of the old member countries, cf. 
table 1. The figures in the second column on per capita income do, however, overestimate the 
difference in standards of living; the price level in low income countries is usually much 
lower than in the rich countries. Still, the difference is substantial and much bigger than the 
corresponding difference when Spain and Portugal, not to speak of Greece, became members 
of the EEC. 
 
Experience shows that economic integration is easier to obtain when the income level of the 
participants is rather similar and - what may amount to the same - that urban industries in all 
the member countries play an important role. In rural areas, it is much more difficult to create 
conditions for increased efficiency and economic growth. This is part of the background for 
the problems with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy (the CAP), discussed below. 
 
On this background, the difficult process of EU integration will be facilitated if a further 
increase of the number of member countries can be postponed, perhaps even avoided in a 
foreseeable future. Bulgaria and Rumania are already accepted as applicants, but their income 
level is at the very bottom of the European countries; in addition, the size of the Rumanian 
population is far from insignificant, more than 20 million inhabitants. 
 
During the military and political unrest on the Balkan in the 1990´ies, the EU gave several 
promises with respect to closer ties to EU. Slovenia is one of the new EU countries, but how 
fast the other Balkan countries may get closer ties to the EU remains to be seen. An additional 
problem is here that a substantial part of the population is muslim. 
 
This holds even more for Turkey. In addition, almost all of Turkey is situated outside Europe, 
and the size of the Turkish economy is not negligible; the Turkish population exceeds 60 
million. The status of Turkey as a possible member is probably partly reflecting the high 
priority related to Turkey´s status as a Nato member. At least, the population has a cultural 
and religious background very different from that of the present EU countries. If Turkey 
became a full member, the EU would have Iran and Iraq as their neighbours with the Kurds 
inbetween. 
 
In addition, the Turkish population has shown a substantial interest in emigrating to the 
European countries, but without much interest in becoming integrated in the countries where 
they have settled down. Hence the immigration problems of the EU countries to a large extent 
are caused by Turkish immigration. 
 
 
Immigration and mobility of labour.  
 
EU members have liberalized capital movements, and free capital movement for members of 
the euro area is an important part of the rules for the foreign exchange union, as is discussed 
further below. On the other hand, labour mobility inside the EU has turned out to be rather 
limited, not least for unskilled labour. The immigration problems which are facing many EU 
countries are due to immigration from the rest of the world: old colonies and not least from  
muslim countries. 
 
Immigrants from other EU countries usually are rather easily integrated in the countries where 
they settle down, probably because their number is limited and their cultural and religious 
background is rather similar. 
 
Immigration from less developed countries - often muslim - gives rise to more difficult 
problems, and even the order of magnitude of the yearly immigration is difficult to express in 
quantitative terms. Statistics from the United Nations use a definition of ALess developed 
countries@ which is rather useful; the EU statistics do, however, include Turkey among the 
European countries. 
 
Problems are even bigger with respect to comparable figures for the number of foreigners at a 
given point of time in various EU countries. How do we define a foreigner? If a person 
obtains citizenship in the country where he settles down, does his status change, 
independently of whether he actually has been integrated in his new country - and how do we 
establish criteria for, to which extent integration has taken place? 
 
To analyse these problems will take us too far away. But it should be stressed that problems 
related to immigration from developing countries must be expected to be permanent. Here it 
should be recalled that the population in most EU countries is not able to reproduce itself. The 
reason for this is more advanced ways of avoiding pregnancy combined with increasing 
interest among women to take an active role on the labour market. With long run tendencies 
for the population in the rich (European) countries to decline and for the population in the 
poor, less developed, countries to increase, the immigration pressure must be expected to 
continue in the foreseeable future. 
 
It is generally expected that the risk for the labour markets in the present EU countries to 
come under pressure as a consequence of the increase of the number of EU members from 15 
to 25 will be rather limited. But other problems will gradually require attention, one being the 
structure of the social service systems in the various member countries. For instance, the 
Scandinavian welfare state is traditionally based on the idea that social benefits are obtained 
from government budgets and hence financed by the tax payers. With free mobility of 
persons, it may be tempting for citizens in EU countries to move to member countries with 
high rates for, e.g., old age pensions. On this background it must be expected that social 
security systems in the various EU countries will be adjusted so that payments to the 
individual citizen will depend on earlier insurance contributions or payments to social 
security funds as part of wages receipts. 
 
 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. 
 
The CAP has been an important - and controversial - part of EU policies ever since the start 
of the EU (the Six) in the late 1950´ies. Contrary to earlier schemes, the Common Market (the 
EEC) was to include agriculture; this was not the case for the European Free Trade Area (the 
Seven), established at the same time and including countries which had not become members 
of the EU, Britain and six others. 
 
From the beginning, the basic EU idea was to stabilize prices obtained by EU farmers. 
Subsidies to farmers took the form of price support, EU producer prices exceeding world 
market prices. This implied incentives for agricultural output to increase, but this 
consequence was accepted since, around 1960, EU was a net importer of several agricultural 
products. However, this situation changed after a few years and ever since, the basic problem 
of the CAP has been that production exceeded consumption, the surplus production being 
exported, often at prices far below domestic prices (dumping?) or simply destroyed. Hence 
EU consumers have to pay higher food prices than consumers elsewhere, and farmers in the 
rest of the world, not least in developing countries, find it difficult to compete with cheap EU 
agricultural products, perhaps even imported as part of assistance to developing countries. 
 
In addition, the CAP has been a very expensive scheme for the EU to carry through. A few 
decades ago agricultural subsidies corresponded to almost two thirds of total EU 
expenditures. This share has now been reduced to roughly one half, but this is still an 
impressive amount. 
 
It will take us too far to embark upon a more detailed analysis of the CAP rules for individual 
products; they vary a great deal from product to product. Basically, consumers should be 
offered, and producers should receive, the same prices in all member countries, these prices 
exceeding world market prices. Obviously, changes of exchange rates vis-a-vis other member 
countries do create substantial difficulties for such a system to function, and these CAP 
problems were one of the strong reasons why the creation of a foreign exchange union got 
high priority. 
 
Traditionally, French farmers have benefited from the CAP, while Western Germany has 
contributed to the scheme. Britain, being a net importer of agricultural products from its old 
empire, did not benefit from the CAP. This was one of the reasons for Margaret Thatcher´s 
critical attitude versus the EU. 
 
The question may be raised why the CAP, giving rise to so many problems and having so 
large financial impilcations, has survived for almost half a century. One of the fundamental 
explanations is that the mobility of rural population is low, especially if they own their farms. 
Agriculture is a very capital intensive industry. Wage earners in agriculture may move to 
urban industries, but the owners themselves are rather immobile, and they find it difficult to 
adjust to urban activities. Hence structural changes mainly take place when they retire. If 
politicians want to speed up this process, they will usually be met by active lobbyism. This 
resistance is strengthened by the fact that farmers in rural areas often feel attached to their 
present way of life in surroundings where they and their predecessors have lived for 
generations. 
 
Still, in the long run the CAP is bound to be changed. A policy based on incentives to 
increased production in economies with substantial surplus production does not make sense. 
When agricultural products can be purchased abroad to prices far below EU home market 
prices and the value added in part of agriculture, measured at world market prices, is 
insignificant, structural changes are urgently needed.  
 
The basic principles behind the World Trade Organisation (WTO) indicate that export prices 
must equal domestic prices. Hence CAP will have to be scrapped. There will probably also be 
a long run tendency for agricultural prices in EU to decline. But completely to abolish 
subsidies to agriculture is not a realistic expectation. However, the WTO philosophy may 
point to a system, according to which subsidies should be given to low income farmers rather 
than to prices. Hence subsidies to agriculture should be considered part of social security and 
be financed by the individual member country (perhaps assisted by contributions from EU 
regional funds). Obviously, such a policy would not be welcomed by the new members, 
especially to the extent that each of them would have to finance the agricultural subsidies to 
their own farmers. 
 
On this background, a change from price support to income subsidies is not likely to take 
place in the foreseeable future. Instead, present low agricultural prices in the new member 
countries will approach EU prices over a transition period; France and Germany have agreed 
on a ceiling for the total amount of agricultural subsidies. It was no accident that the final 
issue to be settled at the negotiations on extention of membership last December was Polish 
insistance on more favorable conditions for the new members with respect to agriculture. In 
Poland, the number of small scale farmers is high and efficiency in agriculture is low. And 
there was a symbolic aspect in the fact that it was Germany which gave the final concession.  
 
  
The Economic and Monetary Union, EMU. 
 
Lithuania being one of the new EU members, it is worth going into some detail on the status 
of the these countries with respect to foreign exchange cooperation. If a new member 
confirms its EU membership at the referendum, it will automatically also become a member 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but only an Aouter@ member, ie. it will not join 
the euro foreign exchange union. Hence, it will get the same status as, eg., Sweden and 
Denmark. 
 
But as a new member, it will have to introduce the euro when it fulfills the criteria for 
participation, the so-called convergence criteria, and it will have to adjust its economic policy 
in order to fulfill these criteria. It must, however, be expected that a substantial number of 
years is required for the new members of the EMU, before they are ready to join the euro. 
Institutions must be created or adjusted in order to be able to cope with the problems of a 
market economy, and a higher income level would also facilitate the process leading to entry 
into the euro union. 
 
The convergence criteria have four main elements. The first is sound government finances, 
the second is price stability and the third requires that long term interest rates must be similar 
to those of the present members with low inflation rates. 
 
Finally, the foreign exchange rates of the new member country must have shown stability vis-
a-vis the euro over the two preceding years. Membership of the EMU for the new countries is 
planned to start in May 2004, hence they cannot become euro members before 2006. 
  
 
The Foreign Exchange Union (Euroland). 
 
The EU foreign exchange union became operational from 1999 onwards with the euro (EUR) 
as its unit of exchange. Today, it has 12 EU countries as members. Britain, Sweden and 
Denmark so far have remained outside; Sweden will hold a referendum on this issue in 
September 2003. 
 
By definition, the members have to use the euro, hence they have no possibility of having 
their own foreign exchange policy; (this is a continuation of the fourth convergence criterion). 
If a member has inflation at a higher rate than the other members, it is bound to get into 
trouble. 
 
Short term interest rates are determined centrally by the European Central Bank (ECB). When 
deciding on the short term interest rate, its main aim is to keep inflation below 2 per cent. 
(This is a continuation of the second and third convergence criteria). Only if this requirement 
is met, the ECB may pay attention to other factors, eg. unemployment, when it determines the 
common short term interest rate. 
This arrangement, combined with free capital movements, implies that monetary policy is 
highly centralised; there is not much scope left for monetary policy by each individual 
member country. Such centralized decision making has never been accepted by member 
countries when it comes to fiscal policy. Here, each member country decides on its own 
budget. But this cannot be done without coordination of fiscal policies of all the member 
countries. Attempts to establish such a coordination, corresponding to a continuation of the 
first convergence criterion which required sound government finances, have given rise to 
much disagreement, reflecting partly political considerations (budgets should be decided upon 
by parliaments in the individual member countries) and partly fundamental disagreement 
among economists on the importance of fiscal policy as compared with monetary. 
 
 
Fiscal Policy in Euro Member Countries. 
 
The immediate suggestion with respect to requirements for the fiscal policy of each individual 
member might be that total government budget should not be allowed to show a deficit, and 
the actual rules are not far from this idea: Budget deficits must not exceed three per cent of 
GNP, and government debt must not exceed 60 per cent of GNP. 
 
A basic problem with such a simple rule is that surpluses or deficits on government accounts 
may reflect business conditions rather than being the result of changes of fiscal policy 
instruments. If the economy grows at full employment, the tax base will increase, and so will 
tax receipts. At the same time, government expenditures on social security, eg. unemployment 
benefits, will be low. Hence government finances will show a surplus. But to take advantage 
of the surplus and, eg., reduce taxes would lead to an increase of total demand, which at full 
employment may increase tendencies to inflation.   
 
A similar way of reasoning can be applied when an economy goes into a recession. Tax 
receipts will decline, expenditures on social security will increase and government finances 
will deteriorate. To increase taxes in order to cover the deficit would, however, be a mistake; 
the consequence would be a further reduction of total demand and perhaps even bigger 
unemployment. 
 
The conclusion of this way of reasoning might be that, when quantitative rules are established 
for good fiscal policy conduct, cyclical elements in the surplus/deficit on government 
accounts should be eliminated, eg. by calculating a Afull employment@ surplus or deficit. 
There is, however, no simple way of making such estimates. 
 
Obviously, the bigger the government sector is, the more important is the way in which it is 
treated. The mechanisms, just described, may be considered Aautomatic stabilisers@, 
dampening booms as well as recessions. But in practice, fiscal policy has not always be 
assigned such a passive role. During recessions, there will be a temptation for the government 
to increase government expenditures (or reduce taxes) in order to increase total domestic 
demand. This may lead to a violation of the euro fiscal policy rules, but can perhaps be 
justified if the government accounts have shown surpluses in the preceding years, if the 
increased deficits are only temporary (but who can guarantee that?) and the economy shows 
no inflationary tendencies.  
 
But perhaps the problems behind the deficit are structural, caused by, eg., insufficient rules of 
conduct in the labour market or other basic factors (eg. the German reunion, leaving the 
eastern part of the country in a very poor shape). Under such circumstances, structural 
problems require structural solutions - and not just an increase of government deficits in order 
to stimulate total demand. 
 
Prior to the oil crises during the 1970´ies, the level of ambition in many countries on using 
fiscal policy for Afine tuning@ of the economy at full employment was high. But the results did 
not live up to expectatios. Instead, tendencies emerged for the rate of inflation to increase. 
Several explanations were given for this outcome. The timelag from the decision in 
Parliament on increased government expenditures and till they affect total demand is difficult 
to predict, especially for attempts to stimulate investment. In addition, a Acrowding out@ 
mechanism may be involved, increased government spending being neutralised by a reduction 
of private demand. 
 
In my own view, the lack of success for economists to make reliable forecasts for the - 
national or international - economy is to a large extent due to the fact that, so far, no 
satisfactory way has been found to predict (changes of) expectations of the agents in the 
market with respect to the future behaviour of main economic macro variables: growth, 
inflation etc. Outbreak of wars etc. are, of course, far beyond the reach for economists to 
predict, but also forecasts of the length of future business cycles have not been very 
successful. The basis for our knowledge is limited to experience from the past, but 
expectations on the future are seldom rational.  
 
Summarising these pieces of evidence, the role of fiscal policy as part of stabilization policies 
is regarded by many economists with a good deal of scepticism. It will, however, always be 
tempting for a government in a country with high unemployment to increase government 
expenditures, but this may lead to solutions with higher unemployment in the longer run, 
especially if inflation rates are accelerating. This is probably the background for the the strict 
rules on price stability to be observed by the ECB when it decides on the common short term 
interest rate. 
 
A basic problem for the euro will probably always be that economic development in the 
individual member countries will differ. Hence some countries want the ECB monetary policy 
to be tightened, while others want it to be more expansionist. Also, inflation rates may differ, 
although there will be mechanisms, not least trade with other member countries, which may 
contribute to dampening this effect. If wages get out of control in certain member countries, 
the only remedy may, however, be increased unemployment. 
 
 
An attempt of a few concluding remarks. 
 
The main effect of membership for the new EU countries will probably be related to adjusting 
their institutions to a market economy and to the various EU schemes to support them, not 
least the revised CAP. But it would be of no advantage for most of them to join the Euroland 
in the foreseeable future. The main argument will probably be political: Closer ties to the 
West. 
 
It is doubtful how much the present members will benefit from euro cooperation. It requires a 
substantial amount of political agreement between them, to be implemented in an institutional 
system which allows for efficient decision making. But so far, it has not been possible to find 
satisfactory rules for the conduct of fiscal policy, and existing rules are not respected by some 
euro countries. The deficits on government finances both in Germany and Portugal exceed 
three per cent of GNP. Maximum sanctions in this field are limited to fines.  
 
On this background, the most likely development may be that euro members - not least the 
big ones - decide on their fiscal policies without taking into account the impacts on the whole 
euro area. This pessimistic conclusion is confirmed by the lack of cooperation between the 
big euro countries, which is being illustrated in the field of foreign policy. Most likely - and 
hopefully - the ECB will stick to its present strategy. The result may be one of differences 
between EU countries with respect to growth and employment, inflation etc. This, in turn, 
may reduce the credibility of the euro, inside and outside euro land. 
 
If these pessimistic predictions turn out to be correct, the new member countries will enter a 
EU which cannot agree on very much and probably is on its way to a more extended period of 
stagnation, economically and politically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
